Abstract Continued urban-rural income disparity poses a serious policy challenge in China's economic transition. As the Chinese economy boomed and the state's fiscal capacity grows, the center's capacity in redressing urban-rural inequality should increase. However, it seems that the stronger state extractive capacity since the middle 1990s has not translated into better urban-rural disparity outcomes. Based on a panel data set covering 270 prefectures in China between 1994 and 2003, the paper evaluates the impacts of local fiscal spending on urban-rural income disparity, and finds there is a strong urban-bias in China's local fiscal system under an increasingly centralized fiscal system. The centralized fiscal model has in fact, reinforced this tendency and ironically weakened the capacity of the central state in achieving the policy goal of reducing urban-rural divide.
State Capacity, Local Fiscal Autonomy and Urban-Rural Income Disparity in China 1 Introduction
The market-oriented reforms launched in 1978 have changed the economic landscape of China and have improved the dynamism of both the rural and urban sectors. In the past 30 years, China has transformed itself from a centrally planned economy to an emerging market economy whilst achieving an average GDP growth rate of more than 9 percent. Marketized reform also dramatically reshaped China's countryside. During the early 1980s, agricultural productivity rose steadily with the introduction of Household Responsibility System (HRS). Rapid rural industrialization also took off in the second half of 1980s and continued to grow fast in the early half of 1990s as town and village enterprises (TVEs) evolved quickly to meet a pent up demand for consumer goods and take advantage of a pool of cheap rural labor.
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In the second half of 1990s, increasing number of rural migrants began to find jobs in cities and earn higher income than they would have if they had stayed in rural areas.
However, the development path China has been taking so far is not without problems. One of the most serious challenges is the continued spatial inequality that has been largely biased against the nation's vast countryside. The urban-rural income disparity bounced from 1. 8 in 1984 new policy framework to create a "New Socialist Countryside". With stronger state capacity in terms of government revenue, fiscal policy is now expected to be at the forefront of implementing this strategy.
In the next few years, more fiscal transfers will flow from the center to help build rural basic infrastructure, strengthen agricultural technology extension, scrap tuition fees and textbook charges for children from poor rural families, and fund the newly set-up rural cooperative medical insurance scheme.
Given the continued urban-rural divide and serious under-provision of public services in rural China, the government's new policies to develop a "New Socialist Countryside" are certainly laudable. It is expected that the central transfers will help to alleviate the serious shortfall of financial resources in the countryside. However, will more financial resources alone be adequate to address the rural income issue and alleviate urban-rural disparity? In a country as large as China, the center's ability to implement its policies obviously depends on the effectiveness of the country's local governments. If higher transfers are to address the severe urban-rural disparity, they need to be spent in ways that help to raise farmers' income more rapidly. This further depends on whether local governments in these regions have incentives to do so. By favoring the opinion that higher transfers to rural areas would help to reduce urban-rural disparity, it is implicitly assumed that the allocated funds would reach their intended beneficiaries. However, since under China's current institutional framework, urban populations have much higher political representation and power in local policy-making, will the center's attempt to improve rural livelihood through more financial resources be fulfilled under such a circumstance?
There are a lot of debates in the literature on whether capacity of China's central state to control the local government has been weakened or not during the economic transition. Huang
Yasheng and Maria Edin argue that the central government has strengthened the political control over the nomenklatura system, and is able to implement its policies at the local level. 4 In contrast, other scholars expressed different opinions. For example, a case study on coal production by Tim Wright shows that the China's state capacity has been gradually eroded with the resistance of powerful local coalition, and the central government is severely constrained in distributing economic rents between different interest groups.
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Our research will also approach this issue by examining the effectiveness of local governments in China in enforcing the center's redistribution policies.
Based on a newly acquired prefectural level data set between 1994 and 2003, the paper aims to empirically assess the degree of urban-bias in China's fiscal system at the local level. Moreover, since the higher fiscal capacity of the state in China has been accompanied by a transfer-based decentralization, we attempts to further examine how have the impacts of local government spending on disparity outcomes been affected by the financing patterns of local governments. In another word, does it make a difference when local government spending is mainly financed by locally generated revenue or when it is mostly financed by upper level fiscal transfers? Our panel data starting from 1994 is particularly suitable for such analysis because it was since 1994 and afterwards that China's fiscal system experienced a period of revenue centralization without corresponding changes in spending assignments. This leads to a situation in which increasing share of local spending is financed by upper level transfers. How these changes have affected the center's redistribution capacity in reducing urban-rural disparity is an important question to answer.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Part 2 presents a brief introduction of China's fiscal centralization since 1994. Part 3 discusses the institutional sources of urban-rural disparity and emphasizes that government fiscal policy is playing an increasingly important role in ameliorating or exacerbating urban-rural disparity. We argue that the revenue centralization would reduce local fiscal autonomy and dampen local incentive to serve the rural population. Based on a panel data set that covers 270 prefectures across China, Part 4 first describes some stylized facts of China's urban-rural disparity, local government spending and local fiscal autonomy between 1994
and 2003. This is followed by a regression-based analysis of the impacts of local government spending and fiscal autonomy on urban-rural disparity. Part 5 concludes.
China's Inter-governmental fiscal system

The evolution of China's inter-governmental fiscal system since 1994
The current system of intergovernmental fiscal relations largely reflects the arrangements introduced by a major reform, known as the Tax Sharing System (fenshuizhi) undertaken in 1994.
In 1993, Wang and Hu registered a warning that China's state capacity was declining, exemplified by two phenomena in the mid-1980s: the declining share of the national fiscal revenue in the gross domestic product (GDP) and the decline of the central government's share of the national fiscal revenue. 6 They argued that declining state capacity would also lead to widening regional and urban-rural disparities, which eventually would produce social chaos. To address the issue of weak state and weak center, they believe a fiscal reform that can both raise state's extractive capacity and increase the central share in total budget is necessary.
A fundamental fiscal reform that aimed to ensure both higher revenue collection as a ratio to GDP and a larger share of the central government in total revenue did happen in 1994. These reforms replaced the country's particularistic fiscal-contracting system with a modern tax-assignment system. In contrast to the old system, which had given the central government only a set amount of revenue, the new system designates different categories of taxes to the central and local governments so that central-government revenues grow along with the economy. With the newly introduced value-added tax, business tax and income tax, government revenue has been rising very fast since then. The government revenue was CNY 500 billion in 1994 and rose to CNY Compared to the central revenue share, the central spending share was relatively stable before and after 1994. After 1994, there was an initial small decline from 1994 to 1996, followed by a gradual rise until 2000 when the center strived to boost domestic demand by spending aggressively. Overall speaking, the central transfers increased significantly when the 1994 tax reform was implemented.
However, between 1994 and 2000, there was a small decline with regard to the gap between central revenue share and central expenditure share. This gap began to rise more significantly after 2000.
There was also significant revenue centralization at the sub-national level following the center's revenue centralization move since 1994. One important problem in China's intergovernmental fiscal system is that there is a serious lack of a clear assignment of responsibilities among different levels of governments below the province.
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Such ambiguity leads to a high degree of concurrent and overlapping expenditures among the sub-national levels and may easily lead to revenue concentration and delegation of expenditure responsibilities to lower level governments due to the weak bargaining position of lower level governments. This has been most obvious since the 1994 fiscal reform. The responses of provincial governments were to squeeze even larger shares of revenues from lower level governments and at the same time to assign more responsibilities for expenditure to them. County and township governments suffered most in fiscal terms during this period.
However, expenditure responsibilities after 1994 became heavier with the sub-provincial levels (prefecture, county, and township). The difficulty arose from heavier responsibility for maintaining the social safety due to the transfer of SOE ownership from the central to local governments in the 1980s and early 1990s and the ensuing large-scale restructuring in China's state owned sectors in the late 1990s. Many of the social service and social security responsibilities that had been taken care of by state owned enterprises were now passed to local governments without corresponding resources being set aside to meet these responsibilities.
Many county and township level governments, especially those in less developed regions, 8 had to lay out the bulk of their expenditures on wages for government employees (including employees in local schools and public health institutions). After paying government staff, little was left for local public goods and services. Under such a circumstance, providing redistributive transfers and effective public services to the relatively poor rural population became even less likely. Therefore, the negative impacts of insufficient fiscal resources in poor areas were more heavily born by the poor farmers. In another word, instead of reducing inter-regional fiscal disparity by channeling more transfers to relatively under-developed regions, the centralization in fiscal revenue after 1994 resulted in a growing divergence in the provision of public services across the country and this was particularly biased against rural areas in less developed regions.
Divergence in virtual local fiscal autonomy
Though across China local governments have neither power to set local tax rates nor autonomy in defining their tax bases, this does not mean governments in different localities have access to the same level of locally generated revenue and enjoy similar autonomy in fiscal spending. This is because in China local tax revenues derive mainly from the value added tax, business tax, as well as the enterprise income tax. Since the bases of these taxes typically cover manufacturing and service sectors, localities (mainly in costal provinces) where the shares of the secondary and tertiary sectors in GDP are relatively high fare above average in terms of local revenue collections. In contrast, the central and western provinces, which are predominantly agriculture-based, fare poorly. The same holds for the distribution of the personal income tax that has become increasingly important in recent years. The higher the average household income, the higher the personal income tax revenue is. Consequently the richer coastal provinces could collect much higher personal income tax revenue. Earmarking transfers, compared to general-purpose transfers, is a more effective way of exerting control over the local government since earmarked transfer is a relatively discretionary portion in transfers. As a result, the divergence in virtual local fiscal autonomy is exaggerated.
Urban-rural disparity, Urban Bias in Spending and Local Fiscal Autonomy
Institutional determinants of urban-rural disparity in China
There is a vast literature that explores the institutional determinants of China's continued or even enlarging urban-rural disparity.
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According to this literature, the causes of the rural-urban divide in China have changed over time. As part of China's economic reforms since the late 1970s, a series of economic policies have been introduced to reduce urban-rural divide. These policies included the adoption of household responsibility system (HRS), the increases of procurement prices for agricultural products, and a gradual relaxation of restrictions of labor mobility to off-farm employment opportunities both within rural and between rural and urban.
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These policies all helped to alleviate urban-rural disparity, though in somewhat different periods. The introduction of HRS, combined with rising agricultural procurement prices then, helped to account for the fast rural income growth and a declining urban-rural income disparity in the first half of 1980s. However, the impact of HRS on rural income growth was basically a level effect that was almost fully exhausted back to the middle 1980s.
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As to labor mobility, there is an overall trend of relaxation on off-farm employment restrictions throughout the reform period. Though some would argue that the existence of labor mobility restrictions and Hukou system have played a role in sustaining urban-rural disparity in the past decade, this argument proves to be difficult to defend since labor mobility has increased very rapidly since the 1990s owing to a fast-growing urban economy and to the concurrent relaxation of labor-mobility restrictions.
14 With lower labor mobility restrictions, tens of millions of migrant farmers are now earning much higher income in cities than they would have if they had stayed on farm. Since most of the rural migrants have not obtained an urban Hukou and therefore are still classified as rural in income statistics, the large-scale rural-urban migration has apparently raised the average rural income and helped to prevent urban -rural disparity from growing even higher.
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Another candidate for sustained urban-rural disparity is China's highly urban-biased financial sector. China's financial sector is highly urban-biased is a well known. Comparatively speaking, China's fiscal system has continued to exert a more direct impact on urban-rural disparity outcomes. This comes both from the taxation side and spending side. As to the taxation bias, at least before early 2000s, farmers in China paid a significantly higher share of their income in the form of direct tax and fees compared to their urban counterparts.
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With the introduction of rural tax reform initiated since 2002, there is a good reason to believe the importance of uneven direct tax burdens on urban-rural disparity will decline.
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However, the role of government spending in shaping urban-rural disparity outcomes has become increasingly important as the fiscal capacity of the state grew fast in the past decade. In principle, higher level of fiscal resources itself means stronger fiscal capacity. This could translate either into more redistributive funds to directly benefit the relatively poor rural population, or into better public goods and services that may indirectly benefit the latter.
However, stronger state capacity does not necessarily means higher incentives of local government to serve the rural population. Under China's current political regime, local government officials are appointed rather than elected. This means in both developed and less developed regions there is no electoral mechanism that would favor the relatively poor rural population who otherwise may benefit through voting given their large number. Under China's current institutional framework, local governments are more responsive to the needs of the urban population that are politically more powerful and economically more affluent. It has been argued that political pressure from the urban population in the reform period has resulted in various transfer programs to promote income growth disproportionately in the urban.
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If such urban bias in government spending continues to exist at the local level, stronger state fiscal capacity would not bring about the decline of urban-rural divide desired by the center.
Fiscal autonomy and the effectiveness of fiscal policy
Our argument goes further than merely assessing the impacts of local government spending per se on urban-rural disparity. We attempt to go one step further to evaluate how the changes of China's inter-governmental fiscal relationship have affected the urban-rural disparity outcomes through their impacts on local fiscal autonomy. The argument is that the changes of inter-governmental fiscal relationship affect local government incentives as well as their effectiveness in fiscal spending. And this further impact urban-rural disparity. The perspective is that within China's politically centralized system, there is a general lack of local government accountability to local population. Nevertheless, there are significant regional heterogeneities with regard to the urban-rural disparity outcomes. We argue that one important determinant of urban-rural disparity is local virtual fiscal autonomy. The effect may come from two channels. The first channel is more indirect through the impacts of fiscal autonomy on growth. Local governments whose spending is mostly financed by locally generated revenue generally have higher incentives to promote economic growth through effective public goods provisioning.
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If growth is pro-poor (or pro-rural, say, through labor mobility) and governments with higher fiscal autonomy have more incentives to promote growth, this may help to alleviate urban-rural disparity indirectly. The second channel is more direct. Local governments with higher spending autonomy are more able to support the relatively poor proportion of their local constituency better because local governments generally have better information about local needs than the upper level government. Higher spending autonomy due to higher share of self-raised revenue, combined with better local information, would result in more effective pro-rural spending and better urban-rural outcomes.
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The same logic works for governments in localities where most fiscal resources come from upper level transfers. Since the fiscal resources come mostly from central grants rather than local tax base and a higher share of their fiscal resources needs to be competed with other localities from the upper level, local governments in these regions have stronger incentives to either engage in showcasing investment that helps to signal political performance to the upper level rather than being genuinely pro-rural, or engage in expanding local bureaucracy that helps to cultivate local political network rather than providing for the rural population. This would in turn enlarge urban-rural disparity when growth is pro-poor. Moreover, because the resources are coming from upper level governments who have more say on where the money to be spent, local governments that are more dependent on upper level transfers generally have little freedom to allocate them into uses that suit local needs most, thus their information advantage are much less utilized in government spending.
We believe that the impacts of local fiscal autonomy (or lack of it) through government spending on urban-rural disparity outcome is an important issue for China because the center has begun to command an increasing share of revenue in the past decade and even local governments in richer regions began to experience higher fiscal dependence on upper level transfers in the past few years. Though one of the claimed aims of revenue centralization is to mobilize more transfers to help the rural people and reduce urban-rural income disparity, such move may further bring down both the incentives and the effectiveness of local governments to provide pro-rural growth and engage in pro-rural spending. Ironically, the current system of local government accountability, combined with further revenue centralization and lower local fiscal incentives and spending autonomy, may serve to exacerbate urban-rural disparity even though the fiscally more powerful center desires the opposite.
The negative impacts of fiscal centralization and spending decentralization financed by central transfers on local governance outcomes have been analyzed extensively in the scholarly literature on fiscal federalism. According to Weingast, 23 any centralization through redistributive fiscal policy will lead to negative local incentives to promote growth and mobilize resources; on the other hand, the actual fiscal arrangements between the center and the localities are usually based on political negotiations rather than on rule-based formula, which renders center's decision on transfer discretionary. 24 Careaga and Weingast 25 further argues that local governments that raise their own revenue have incentives to provide market-enhancing public goods, while governments that rely heavily on revenue-sharing from the central government are more likely to use resources on patronage and rent-seeking. There are also cross-country studies that shows expenditure decentralization (the share of subnational governments in total government spending) will promote per capita delivery of different forms of infrastructure and reduce corruption, however, this effect was stronger when there was greater revenue decentralization (measured by dependence of subnational governments on self-generated revenues rather than fiscal transfers).
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All in all, the mechanisms that a centralized fiscal system works both against economic growth (by lowering local fiscal incentives to promote growth through efficient public goods provisioning) and the effectiveness in pro-rural (or poor) transfers and public services may reasonably work in China. In
Section, we will test these hypotheses using empirical data from Chinese prefectural level cities.
4 Urban-rural disparity and local fiscal spending: an empirical evaluation.
Data
Our data of urban and rural income comes from three different sources. Though from different sources, the data turns out to be pretty consistent with each other and with the national level data provided by the NBS.
Our fiscal data comes from the Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and Counties
Nationwide published by the Ministry of Finance. The urban-rural disparity based on our data displays a very similar trend compared to that based on the NBS national data though our data only covers 260-270 prefectual units out of 333 in China.
Stylized Facts
Urban-rural Income Disparity and Economic Development
There was a decline of urban-rural disparity from 1994 to 1999 and a rise afterwards for both ratios.
The differences in urban-rural disparity between the NBS national data and our data should come from the prefectures that are left out in our data. These administrative units are mostly in western China which probably had, on average lower disparity in early years such as 1994 and 1995, but higher disparity in latter years since 2001.
Based on our prefectural data, we show urban-rural disparities for coastal and inland regions respectively from 1994 to 2003. As shown in the table, China's urban-rural gap is not uniform regionally. The less developed inland regions on average had higher urban-rural income disparity than the more developed coastal regions. In 1994 and 2003, the urban-rural income ratio in inland regions was well above 3 but that in coastal regions was less than 3. Both the coastal and inland regions experienced a decline of urban-rural disparity between 1994 and 1998 followed by a significant rise afterwards. Overall, the urban-rural income disparity in inland regions on average is much higher than that in coastal regions.
Local Government Expenditure
Next let us look at local government expenditure. Based on our prefectural data, Table 2 What happened between 1995 and 1999 was a large restructuring of local state enterprises.
Employees in many local SOES were no longer fiscal dependents when these SOEs were privatized.
Since SOE restructuring was particularly significant in coastal regions, the drop of this ratio was higher there. Starting from 1999, the ratio began to rise again steadily. Since the largest category of local expenditure in China is wages, bonuses, and retirement benefits, 32 this figure indicates that local government spending has become more urban-biased in the past decade.
<Insert figure 2 about here>
Central Fiscal Strength and Local Fiscal autonomy
Based on our prefectural data, Figure 3 further shows the changes in local virtual fiscal autonomy, defined as the share of locally generated fiscal revenue in total local spending. It is interesting to observe that for the nation as a whole, there was a small rise of local (prefectural) fiscal autonomy between 1994 and 1998. Only afterwards this index began to decrease. This could be explained by a faster growth of local taxes such as local business tax and personal income tax after the 1994 tax reform. The rise of this share could be largely attributed to the rise in inland while this share in coastal regions more or less leveled. This is because a large portion of central revenues was committed as tax rebates and earmarked transfers that favor coastal regions. Therefore, inland regions did not receive much transfer (though their local tax revenue such as local business tax also grew very fast). However, local fiscal autonomy for the whole nation began to decline after 1998 when local governments in inland areas started to receive more transfers while local tax revenues in these regions grew at a slower pace. Starting from 2001, fiscal autonomy in all regions began to drop as central transfers increased faster than locally generated revenue.
<Insert figure 3 about here>
Regression-based results
To better analyze the impacts of government spending and fiscal autonomy on China urban-rural disparity outcome, we employ regression-based empirical analysis using a panel data model. Our empirical specification is the following:
Where the dependent variable it DISPARITY is the urban-rural income ratio in prefecture i in year t.
it GE is a set of variables representing local fiscal expenditure. FISAUTO is local fiscal autonomy variable, or in another word, the share of local government spending financed by locally generated revenue. it X represents other control variables such as local population size and urbanization ratio(urban population as a share of local population). ν is the unobserved prefecture-specific effect and τ is the time-specific effects, and ε is the error term.
For our purpose, the three key coefficients are  , 1  , 2  ,  can be understood as the effect of economic growth on urban-rural disparity. When it is negatively significant, economic growth is pro-rural. 1
 is the impact of local fiscal policy on urban-rural income disparity and its interpretation depends on the variable used. To evaluate the impacts of overall fiscal policy, we estimate 1  for per capita government expenditure (per capita govexp) and government expenditure as a share of local GDP (govexp/GDP), and fiscal dependents as a share of local population(fiscal dependent/pop). Such estimation will help us to identify whether local government spending is overall urban-biased. To evaluate the impacts of government agriculture-support fiscal policy, we estimate 1  for government agricultural support expenditure as a share of total local expenditure (agrisuppexp/govexp). This will help to identify whether government expenditure to support agriculture will help to reduce urban-rural disparity by boosting rural income growth. GE FISAUTO , is another key coefficient for our purpose.
Interacting the fiscal expenditure variables with local fiscal autonomy, we are assuming that the impacts of government expenditure in exacerbating or ameliorating urban-rural disparity depend on local fiscal autonomy. As hypothesized in Part 3, other things equal, higher local fiscal autonomy tend to reduce local incentives to showcase or hire public employees in spending and promote local government incentive to use their money more effectively, resulting in better urban-rural disparity outcomes. Therefore, 2
 is expected to be negative. We have two alternative definitions for our fiscal autonomy. Fisautonomy1 is defined as the share of locally generated revenue in total local government spending. However, considering there might be fiscal surpluses or deficits that may lead to distortions, we defined Fisautonomy2 as the share of locally generated revenue in total local government spending deducted by government deficits. Using the two alternative definitions of fiscal autonomy will help to test the robustness of our empirical estimations, Since there is no reason to assume that fiscal autonomy itself affect urban-rural income disparity directly, we do not include FISAUTO separately in our estimation equations.. Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics of the key variables. To facilitate understanding, the variables are expressed in their original values.
<Insert Table 3 about here> Table 4 and 5 shows the empirical results using fiscalautonomy1 and fisautonomy2
respectively. We use values in logarithms for all variables except the fiscal autonomy variables so that the coefficients can be understood as elasticities. In both estimations, we controlled prefecture-specific dummies and time (year) dummies. Since all of our independent variables except local population and urbanization ratio may suffer from endogeneity, we also estimate our equations using the lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables as instruments. In addition, the prefecture-specific dummies and year dummies also help to somewhat address this endogeneity issue. For example, the effect of local political structure can be controlled by the dummies.
The coefficients for per capita GDP are invariably negative and significant, indicating that economic development will help to reduce urban-rural income disparity. In another word, economic growth is overall pro-rural. The possible reason for this is that with development of TVEs in rich region, rural population can benefit from the off-farm employment. Since there is already an extensive literature on the positive impacts of fiscal autonomy on economic growth, we can reasonably infer that higher fiscal autonomy may help to reduce urban-rural disparity indirectly through its positive impacts on economic growth. In all the regressions, given the level of per capita GDP, the coefficients of urbanization ratio and population size are insignificant.
The coefficients for government expenditure as a share of GDP (govexp/GDP), per capita government expenditure (per capita govexp), and fiscal dependents as a share of local population (fiscal dependents/pop) are all positive and statistically significant in Table 4 and 5. This indicates a strong urban-bias in China's local government spending. Though the coefficients for agricultural support expenditure as a share of total local government spending (agrsuppexp/govexp) is negative (or pro-rural), it is statistically insignificant. It means that the declining fiscal support on agriculture has a limited impact on urban-rural disparity.
The more interesting findings come from the coefficients of the interaction terms between our fiscal policy variables with fiscal autonomy variables. As our estimation shows, these coefficients are all negative and statistically significant. The opposite signs of the fiscal policies and their interactive variables are consistent with our hypotheses. Moreover, these results are quite robust when the different measures on fiscal autonomy are adopted. These results together imply that though China's local fiscal spending is highly urban biased, higher local fiscal autonomy will marginally reduce such urban-bias. Or in another word, local fiscal autonomy helps to strengthen the pro-rural impacts of government expenditure in supporting agricultural and rural development.
<Insert Table 4 
and 5 about here>
Though the empirical evidence is largely supportive of our theoretical hypotheses, it is necessary to mention the limitations of these findings. First, our analysis only estimates the current-year impacts of independent variables on dependent variable. However, government spending, especially in the form of local public goods and services such as infrastructure and education, may well have impacts lasting beyond one year. 33 Second, using the lagged values of potentially endogenous variables as instruments for these variables is still an imperfect way of controlling for endogeneity. Given the data limitation and the difficulty to find good instruments that can be regarded as a truly exogenous shock to the instrumented variables, our choice of instruments can only be regarded as a second best.
Conclusion
In the past decade, the extractive capacity of the Chinese state has grown fast. With more resources at hand, the central government has sought to invest in rural areas in the form of central transfers to address the issue of enlarging urban-rural disparity. Though there is no doubt that the center's move would help to address the serious financial shortfall in less developed regions, we argue in this paper that stronger extractive capacity of the state alone is not enough to effectively strengthen state capacity in income redistribution and to alleviate the problem of urban-rural divide in China. We argue in this paper this has to do with the urban-bias in local government spending and lack of local concerns for the politically weak rural population. Moreover, as local governments became more dependent on upper level transfers due to revenue centralization, the effectiveness of fiscal spending to promote rural income via increasing transfers may be discounted. Therefore, to promote farmers' income by effectively providing their needed public goods, further fiscal and political reforms maybe necessary. Fiscally, local governments may need higher fiscal autonomy so that they have better incentives and means to promote local economic growth and serve the relatively poor rural people more effectively. Political reform to enhance local government's accountability by meaningful local participation, particularly the participation of rural population， is also necessary to rectify the strong urban-bias in China's fiscal system. 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3
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Source: Authors' calculation. Papers and Proceedings 89, No.2 (1999): 306-10. 13 Though there was another round of agricultural procurement price rise in the middle 1990s, this was concurrent with rising prices in China's grain market in the same period. The state grain sector, in competing with private business in grain market, had to offer a higher grain procurement prices. Therefore, it was rather the rising grain market prices than the rising government procurement prices that helped to account for a short period of declining urban-rural income disparity between 1994 and 1997. Starting from the early 2000s China has witnessed a fast liberalization in agricultural market, which renders the role of government pricing instruments even less important with respect to changes in rural income and urban-rural disparity. See Alan De Brauw, Huang, Jikun, and Rozelle, Scott. "The Sequencing of Reform Policies in China's Agricultural Transition", Economics of Transition 12, No. 3 (2004): 427-65. 14 According to the 2000 National Population Census, there were already 121 million migrants (defined as all individuals who had migrated out of their place of residence and looked for employment for at least 6 months in the past year) by 2000, of whom 90 million were found in urban areas (88.4 million of these had originated in rural areas). National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Collection of Data for China's Fifth Population Census in 2000 . Beijing: China Statistical Press, 2002 It has been argued that the impacts of urbanization on the rural-urban gap might be measured in a biased way. The migration of farmers from the rural to the urban may lead to increasing disparity, but total welfare might move in the opposite direction. That is the so called "cream-skimming" effect. However, in China only very limited number of migrants obtained urban Hukou. In China's statistical system, the 120-150 million migrant workers who already earn most of their income in cities are still counted as rural residents in calculating urban and rural incomes. Therefore, the urban-rural disparity would be much higher if there have not been so many rural-urban migrants who earned quite a significant income from cities and who have boosted the per capita rural income significantly.
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Shangjin Wei, "Siamese Twins-Is There State-Owned Bias. " China Economic Review 8, No. 1, (1997): 19-30. 17 Though this does not necessarily imply China's financial system is becoming less pro-urban since there might still be overall higher rates of return in urban investment, it has more to do with market forces rather than explicit governments policies or urban-biased institutions. After all, here we are analyzing the impacts of institutional factors rather than the market forces that may impact urban-rural disparity in China. A caveat is that in the same period implicit taxation through low compensation land requisition in urban expansion and transport networking may have actually increased, but this is an issue we will not discuss in this article. An important reason for local government to choose growth-promoting public goods is that they will
